Subjectivity (first-person perspective)
Subjectivity — the first-person perspective — is τ-categorically the structural property of a Mind-Topos to admit a *global section* that points to itself: the system has a vantage from which all its representations are *its* representations. Subjectivity is not an extra ingredient added to neural activity; it is the categorical fact that the mind-topos's global section (consciousness, VII.T41) carries an internal index pointing back at the topos.
τ-Definition
Subjectivity — the first-person perspective — is τ-categorically the structural property of a Mind-Topos to admit a *global section* that points to itself: the system has a vantage from which all its representations are *its* representations. Subjectivity is not an extra ingredient added to neural activity; it is the categorical fact that the mind-topos's global section (consciousness, VII.T41) carries an internal index pointing back at the topos.
Categorical invariant. Subjectivity = the existence of a self-indexing global section σ ∈ Γ(M_τ) such that σ factors through the internal self-model. Phenomenally: 'mineness' = the coincidence of the global section with the self-recognition operator (VII.T42).
Primary registry anchor:
VII.T41
τ-Derivation Chain
-
I.K0— Universe Postulate -
VII.D82— Mind as Internal Topos -
VII.T39— Mind-Topos Structure Theorem -
VII.T41— Consciousness as Global Section — unity of experience from gluing axiom -
VII.T42— Self-Recognition as E₃ Operator — the global section indexed back at itself
Lean modules referenced:
TauLib.BookVII.Logos.Sector
Phenomenological Correlate
Subjectivity is instantiated whenever experience is *had by* a subject — the mineness or for-me-ness of perception, the unity of the visual field, the indexicality of 'I'. Every Mind-Topos with a global section that factors through self-recognition (VII.T42) has subjectivity. The 'view from nowhere' is structurally impossible inside a Mind-Topos because the global section is always self-indexed.
Examples:
- The unity of the visual field — multiple percepts presented as one subject's field (Mind-Topos global section)
- The indexicality of 'I' — first-person pronouns track the self-index of the global section
- Anosognosia and depersonalisation — partial failure of the self-index without loss of all experience (selectively broken self-recognition coupling)
- The unattainability of the third-person view of one's own experience — proven structural, not contingent
Register codomain: Reg_E reads what the subject sees; Reg_P reads what the subject must do; Reg_C reads what the subject commits to. The *subject* is the common index — the self-pointing structure shared across all four register-readouts.
Manuscript reference: manuscript-sources/book-07/part09/ch108.tex
Lean Coverage
Status: Formalized
Module: TauLib.BookVII.Logos.Sector
Lean kind: theorem
Lean symbol: Tau.BookVII.Logos.Sector.consciousness_as_global_section